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Abstract
Although concerns have historically been raised about the influence of external donors on health
policy process in recipient countries, remarkably few studies have investigated perspectives and
experiences of domestic policymakers and advisers. This study examines donor influence at differ-
ent stages of the health policy process (priority setting, policy formulation, policy implementation
and monitoring and evaluation) in two aid-dependent LMICs, Cambodia and Pakistan. It identifies
mechanisms through which asymmetries in influence between donors and domestic policy actors
emerge. We conducted 24 key informant interviews—14 in Pakistan and 10 in Cambodia—with
high-level decision-makers who inform or authorize health priority setting, allocate resources and/
or are responsible for policy implementation, identifying three routes of influence: financial resour-
ces, technical expertise and indirect financial and political incentives. We used both inductive and
deductive approaches to analyse the data. Our findings indicate that different routes of influence
emerged depending on the stage of the policy process. Control of financial resources was the most
commonly identified route by which donors influenced priority setting and policy implementation.
Greater (perceived) technical expertise played an important role in donor influence at the policy for-
mulation stage. Donors’ power in influencing decisions, particularly during the final (monitoring
and evaluation) stage of the policy process, was mediated by their ability to control indirect finan-
cial and political incentives as well as direct control of financial resources. This study thus helps
unpack the nuances of donor influence over health policymaking in these settings, and can poten-
tially indicate areas that require attention to increase the ownership of domestic actors of their
countries’ health policy processes.
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Introduction
The influence of governments, multilateral agencies and private
agencies that provide funds or conduct activities with the stated aim
of improving health in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
(collectively termed ‘donors’) remains prominent in the health policy
process of recipient countries (Ollila 2005; Fraser and Whitfield
2009; Ravishankar et al. 2009). It is well documented that donor
influence, or their ability to direct the decisions or priorities of
national health policymakers, occurs when there is substantial reli-
ance of recipient countries on external funding. For example, this
can occur through the use of conditionality in policy-based lending
or through the funding of vertical programmes, informed by particu-
lar policy approaches (Okuonzi and Macrae 1995; Rutkowski 2007;
Groves and Hinton 2013). However, in some countries, donor influ-
ence on health priority setting has been prominent even in the
absence of substantial funding flows (Sridhar and Gomez 2011).
Even when donors have reduced conditionality on funding, or pro-
vided direct budgetary assistance, questions have been raised about
the use of alternative mechanisms by donors to continue to influence
national policy processes (Mosley et al. 1995; Koeberle 2003;
Swedlund 2013). Indeed, Harrison (2001) has used the term ‘post-
conditionality’ to reflect new modalities by which donors continue
to influence recipient countries through more routine and central-
ized practices, such as national plans, surveys or budgeting and
monitoring exercises; although these mechanisms have not yet
been fully investigated, Harrison’s findings resonate with what
Molenaers and Renard (2008) refer to as a ‘new aid approach,’ in
which donors have started to support changes to planning and deci-
sion-making structures and processes (in addition to previous
modalities of vertical project funding or horizontal budget support).
Numerous papers have highlighted the problems that can arise
from donor dominance in the health policy processes of LMICs.
These include overshadowing of recipient countries’ existing pro-
grams and priorities, overlooking strengths and absorptive capaci-
ties of national health systems, and their ability to sustain gains once
donor funding ends (Travis et al. 2004; Ollila 2005; Khan and
Coker 2014). There are also more fundamental governance chal-
lenges that external influence can raise in terms of accountability to
local populations and country ownership over policy—key princi-
ples that many global health actors at least purport to endorse
(Okuonzi and Macrae 1995). In recent decades, the global commun-
ity has made concerted efforts to rethink the way that development
assistance for health is utilized in response to a number of challenges
around donor fragmentation, effectiveness and influence (cf Paris
Declaration 2005; Accra Agenda for Action 2008); however, studies
indicate that progress is uneven and slow (Woods et al. 2011), with
some arguing that the increased emphasis on global programs and
priority setting initiatives—such as the Global Polio Eradication
Initiative and the Global School Health Initiative—is undermining
national health policy process in LMICs (Yamey 2002).
Although concerns have been raised about the influence of
donors on health systems and national sovereignty in LMICs
(Yamey 2002; Shiffman, 2008; Biesma et al. 2009; World Health
Organization Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group
2009; Hafner and Shiffman 2013; Khan and Coker 2014), relatively
few studies have actually investigated in depth the perspectives and
experiences of domestic policymakers and advisers with regard to
donor influence over health policy (Okuonzi and Macrae 1995;
Hanefeld 2010; Spicer et al. 2010; Chima and Homedes 2015;
Parkhurst et al. 2015). Understanding LMIC policy actors’ experien-
ces of donor influence, and what mechanisms underpin the relation-
ships of LMIC institutions with donors, however, is crucial to
strengthening national ownership of health policies and promoting
good governance more broadly. Considering the dearth of informa-
tion on this topic from Asian contexts, our study examines donor
influence and dynamics between donors and domestic policy actors
during different stages of the health policy process in two Asian
LMICs, Cambodia and Pakistan.
Study setting
We analysed the roles of donors in two Asian countries—Cambodia
and Pakistan—to capture diversity in health systems, as well as com-
monalities in terms of aid dependence, while drawing on the
researchers’ strong working relationships and links with stakehold-
ers in these countries. As eliciting the ‘true’ views of policy actors
can be challenging, and can impact on the quality of policy research
findings (Walt et al. 2008), our country selection ensured that data
collection was conducted by experienced policy researchers who had
lived in the study country for significant periods of time, with strong
local links and contextual knowledge.
Although Pakistan and Cambodia represent diverse contexts in
terms of population size, history and health system structure, com-
monalities include dependence on external aid and low government
investment in health, which has meant that external funding has been
a major contributor to resources for health in both countries
(Table 1); this is known to affect the level of autonomy a country has
in setting and implementing its health policies (Goldsmith 2001).
Government expenditure on health is similar (just under $15 per cap-
ita) in both countries, although as a percentage of growth domestic
product (GDP) Cambodia spends 6% on healthcare, whereas
Pakistan spends half of that, lower than a commonly cited 5% WHO
benchmark (Savedoff 2007). Pakistan, which is a more populous
Key Messages
• Better understanding of low- and middle-income country domestic policy actors’ experiences of donor influence during
priority setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and monitoring and evaluation of policies, and what mecha-
nisms drive this, can be critical for strengthening national ownership of health policies.
• This study involving high-level policy actors in Pakistan and Cambodia indicated that control of financial resources was
the most commonly identified route by which donors influenced priority setting and policy implementation.
• However, unequal power relations may be perpetuated in subtle ways beyond control of financial resources, including
exclusionary practices in knowledge production, dissemination, and utilization for policy and planning. Thus, a truly
‘new aid approach’ should reconsider not only financing and lending modalities, but also important issues in the daily
practice of donor–recipient relations, including the extent to which local expertise is supported, valued and involved at
all stages in the policy process.
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country, also roughly receives four times the amount of development
aid than Cambodia does. However, when analysed per capita,
Pakistan received less than half as much as Cambodia, and has also
experienced more fluctuations in annual aid levels than Cambodia.
Both Cambodia and Pakistan have faced challenges in recent
decades which have weakened or slowed development, and there are
signs that domestic policymakers are trying to improve the situation.
In the early 1990s, Cambodia emerged from two decades of civil
conflict, embarking in a process of democratic transition and state
reconstruction. Cambodia’s political transition ended a long period
of isolation, opening the country to greater engagement with the
international community and large flows of foreign aid assistance.
In the process, international actors and institutions played a central
role in setting the policy agenda, defining priorities and approaches
through the politics of funding. In recent years, however, further
changes have occurred. While the government is still dependent on
foreign aid in many sectors (Ear 2013), economic growth and the
strengthening of institutional structures, such as the Department of
Planning and Health Information, have increased local ownership
and management of decision-making processes.
Similarly, Pakistan’s health and human development has been
affected by conflicts along the country’s northern borders, problems
with internal security, governance challenges, high population growth
and natural disasters in the form of major floods and earthquakes
between 2000 and 2015 (Nishtar et al. 2013). Steps are being taken to
improve governance and institutional capacity. For example, the dev-
olution of health as part of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in
2010 was implemented to increase accountability and policymaker
capacity at the provincial level (Government of Pakistan 2010).
Building on the principles outlined in the National Health Vision—
bringing together provincial and national level policy makers as well
as academics and private sector representatives—a major reform of
the health sector was launched in 2016, after a 15-year gap without
any significant policy change (Government of Pakistan 2016).
Methods
Data collection
We defined policy actors as high-level decision-makers who inform
or authorize health priority setting, allocate resources and/or are
responsible for policy implementation. We focused on domestic pol-
icy actors, including those working at the national and provincial
levels. Consultants, in-country donor representatives or non-
governmental organization actors that liaise closely with policy-
makers were also included to collect multiple perspectives on the
domestic policymaking environment.
Initially, five policy actors in each country were identified purpo-
sively based on professional connections of the research team
through ongoing or previous public health research in the countries.
During the initial interviews, the other participants were identified
through snowball searching in which each policy actor introduced
researchers to one or two potential informants in their network. In
total, we conducted 24 in-depth, semi-structured interviews (14 in
Pakistan and 10 in Cambodia). To ensure broad representation, we
interviewed high-level policy actors involved in planning or imple-
mentation in a range of health areas and contexts, including mater-
nal and child health, infectious diseases, and in primary and tertiary
healthcare delivery, to explore common and contrasting experiences.
These policy actors worked in government agencies and non-
governmental organizations agencies in senior positions as national
policy advisors, civil servants, program directors/managers and pro-
viders of technical expertise. Our topic guide aimed to: (1) elicit
policy actors’ perceptions about the influence of donors at four key
stages of the policy process (priority setting, policy formulation, pol-
icy implementation and monitoring and evaluation) (Parsons, 1995)
and (2) identify mechanisms through which asymmetries in influ-
ence between donors and domestic policy actors emerge, and how
they can be addressed.
Interviews in each country were led by one of the researchers in
English or the local language depending on the interviewee’s prefer-
ence. If consent was obtained, interviews were audio-recorded.
Interviews lasted between 45 and 60 min and hand-written notes
were taken during and after each interview. Recorded interviews
were transcribed verbatim in full. Interviews that were conducted in
languages other than English were translated into English and the
interviewer reviewed the translated transcripts to verify accuracy of
translation. No contacts refused to participate, although three par-
ticipants preferred not to be recorded.
Analysis
We conducted a thematic analysis starting with deductive coding
and grouping of transcripts in relation to three means of influence:
financial resources, technical expertise and indirect financial and
political incentives. We decided to focus on these routes of influence
based on former studies that documented their relevance to policy-
making (Dalglish et al. 2015) and on theories of power including
Foucault’s (Bunton et al. 2002), in which power and knowledge are
interconnected, and Lukes’ conceptualization (Lukes 2005), who
identified three ‘dimensions’ of power (or means by which power is
exercised in policymaking): power of decision-making, power of set-
ting the agenda and ideological influence. Specifically, we focused
on financial resources, technical expertise and intersectoral leverage.
In our study, influence mediated through the direct control of
Table 1. Key indicators from Cambodia and Pakistan (World Health Organization 2014; The World Bank 2016)
Indicators Cambodia Pakistan
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Population (millions) 14.4 14.6 14.8 15.1 15.3 170.0 173.7 177.4 181.2 188.9
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) 22.1 20.5 17.7 NA NA 36.8 36.3 NA 29.5 NA
Net official development assistance (current US$ million) 733 795 807 805 799 3020 3498 2016 2191 3612
Net official development assistance per capita (current US$) 51 55 55 53 52 18 20 11 12 19
Total health expenditure per capita (current US$) 47 50 59 60 61 31 37 34 34 36
Government health expenditure per capita (current US$) 10 11 12 12 13 11 12 14 14 14
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) 6 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3
NA, not available
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financial resources relates to decisions about resource allocation,
including the time frame of resource availability; therefore, it can be
considered as one of the most ‘visible’ means of exercising influence
across all dimensions (Lukes 2005; Dalglish et al., 2015). Technical
expertise indicates influence gained through the ability to produce,
interpret and disseminate knowledge and information to policy
actors (akin to what Shiffman has termed ‘epistemic power’ in
global health agenda setting) (Shiffman 2014). Finally, intersectoral
leverage refer to means of influence operating outside of the health
sector, such as effects on the international image or standing of
countries which can impact on areas including trade and tourism
(Lin and Gibson 2003; Harris and Siplon 2007). Deductive coding
was followed by an inductive coding phase to identify emerging sub-
themes within the three routes of influence, applying techniques
from the constant comparative method (Boeije 2002), including line
by line analysis of initial interviews (performed independently by
two researchers), the use of subsequent interviews to test prelimi-
nary assumptions, and the comparison of codes across countries and
health areas (Strauss 1987; Parsons 1995).
Results
Our interviews with health policy actors in both countries indicated
that, as expected, donors were perceived to exert strong influence
across the four stages of the policy process. The three routes of
influence studied, and specific mechanisms that were important in
establishing donor influence, varied at each stage, as described in the
following sections (and summarized in Table 2).
Agenda or priority setting
Overall, policy actors in Pakistan and Cambodia felt that the level
and availability of external funding often dictated which issues were
placed high on national health agendas as well as the types of inter-
ventions that were selected to address the health issues. Financial
resources were identified as the main mechanism through which
donors either directly shaped national health priorities or indirectly
exerted influence by determining which research or surveys they
fund to provide the evidence base to inform agenda setting and
advocacy. In relation to donors directly shaping which health areas
are prioritized for action through funding availability (or lack
thereof), one international NGO representative and policy advisor
(C1) used mental health in Cambodia as an example to illustrate
how much dependence on donor funding impacts the health policy
agenda. She explained that even though domestic stakeholders were
aware of the urgent need to address mental health issues—owing to
the genocide perpetuated in the country—this was not a priority
health area until 2016 (when the first strategic plan was initiated)
because of a lack of donor funding, on which the government is
reliant.
Table 2. Means of power exercised across the different stages of the policy process in Pakistan and Cambodia, as perceived by domestic
policy actors
Routes of influence
Stages Intersectoral leverage [influence
from impact outside of health
sector such as international
tourism or trade restrictions]
Financial Resources [control of resource allocation,
including time frame of resource availability]
Technical expertise [advantage
through ability to produce, inter-
pret and disseminate knowledge]
Agenda/Priority
Setting
• Impact on international repu-
tation and tourism from
failure to address donor
priorities (Cambodia)
• Potential trade or travel
restrictions (Pakistan)
• Donors select which health areas are provided
funding for, thereby setting agenda
• Donors prioritize which research or surveys they
fund to provide the evidence base to inform
agenda setting (Cambodia and Pakistan)
Policy Formulation • Donors have greater profi-
ciency in using data from
surveys/studies to develop
policies
• Donors can commission sur-
veys/studies to fill knowledge
gaps
• Donors have better coordina-
tion to collaborate on policy
formulation (Cambodia and
Pakistan)
Policy
Implementation
• Financial resources from donors shape the areas
of work of non-governmental organizations
(Cambodia and Pakistan)
• Control timing of availability of resources for
programme implementation; sudden stops and
starts (Pakistan)
Monitoring
& Evaluation
(M&E)
• Donors set (M&E) targets
which must be met to main-
tain international standing
(Cambodia and Pakistan)
• Donors set (M&E) targets which must be met to
receive funding (Pakistan)
• Donors influence which health areas receive
funding to strengthen M&E systems (Cambodia
and Pakistan)
4 Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 0, No. 0
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/heapol/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/heapol/czx145/4718134
by London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine user
on 03 January 2018
In addition to directly influencing policy setting through funding
availability, some interviews (P3, C1, C9) indicated a form of indi-
rect influence donors could have by shaping the areas for which
health information or evidence is available to policymakers during
the agenda setting process. One interviewee in Cambodia explained:
Many times, however, research is driven by funding, not demand.
And this type of research is less relevant to the country. (C9)
Related to this, an international NGO country director and
another international NGO manager who had previously worked in
the public sector (P3, C1) expressed frustration at the lack of fund-
ing made available by their governments for research, which they
identified as a reason for the limited power of policy actors in influ-
encing what evidence is available, and through this, overall health
priority setting.
A majority of policy actors who experienced such a power
dynamic felt they had a limited voice in their country’s health and
health-related research priority setting, despite being in high level
positions (P2, P6, P10, P11, C3, C5). A smaller group of policy
actors (P3, P5, C1) conveyed stronger negative sentiments about
donor influence, for instance stating that external aid could be
harmful when it is not aligned with national policymakers’ prior-
ities. Policy actors (P3, P12, C1) were clear in acknowledging that
the imbalance in power was related to the relatively small amount of
funding from national sources.
[Donors] do play a bit of a negative role, because they’re pushing
for their own issues they see as their priority. There’s funding for
that. . . a big proportion of the health budget is still funded by
external partners and they mostly decide what they want to fund.
(C1)
Indeed, two specific negative consequences of the (perceived)
limited influence of policy actors in their country’s health and
health-related research agenda were expressed in the two countries.
Firstly, as described above, specific health issues or approaches
become prominent in countries—even if they do not fit with the
overall national strategy—because these were better resourced by
donors. The second negative consequence of the perceived lack of
influence of domestic policy actors on priority setting or research
was that important areas considered can be neglected, especially
when donors focus on narrow, pre-determined policy goals. This
view was common in both countries (P5, P7, P9, P10, C1, C2). In
particular, for both research and health programs, there was a com-
mon feeling among interviewees that aspects related to health system
strengthening, such as prevention and primary care, received less
attention because donor funding targeted disease specific programs.
Apart from financial resources, which was found to be the most
salient of the three routes of influence analysed in relation to agenda
or priority setting—bilateral and multilateral donor countries’
power to influence the recipient country’s standing in sectors beyond
health (intersectoral leverage) also played a role in some instances.
Two policy actors in Cambodia (C4, C9) explained that the way
that donors and UN agencies portray Cambodia globally matters
because it has a direct impact on international reputation and tour-
ism; therefore, high-level national policymakers feel the need to par-
ticularly pay attention to priorities of donors and international
agencies such as the World Health Organization. Similarly, two
interviewees from Pakistan (P2, P3) who had held managerial roles
in both public and private organizations believed that the threat of
travel and trade restrictions being introduced by international
organizations if polio was not controlled was important in placing
polio high on the national agenda.
Policy formulation
In contrast to agenda and priority setting, in which control of finan-
cial resources played a major role in mediating donor influence, we
found that technical expertise of donors appeared to be a key route
of influence at the policy formulation stage. Donors were perceived
to have greater proficiency in using data from surveys and research
studies to develop strong policies and strategic plans. Policy actors
also felt that donors were better at filling gaps in evidence whether
by commissioning specific research or relying on their data and
knowledge base to extrapolate findings to inform policies. Several
interviewees in both Cambodia and Pakistan (P2, P4, P5, C1, C5,
C6) felt that local capacity for analysing data to inform policies was
lacking, and that policy formulation was therefore either slow or
not based on sufficient data analysis, as illustrated by one policy
actor in Pakistan working at the provincial level:
We don’t look at statistical information. We don’t run regres-
sions. We don’t look at correlations or causations. We just
decide. (P2)
Two advisers to national policymakers (P12, C2) specifically
identified the language through which technical information and
policy-relevant research was presented as working to disadvantage
policy actors or reinforce the influence of donors. Technical reports
used to inform policy formulation were described as lengthy, written
in English and utilizing complex terms that served as barriers to the
accessibility of the information serving to inform policy choices. As
one interviewee explained: Start first of all with the English lan-
guage, it has already created a barrier for those at the grassroots
level to really connect with the technical expertise. (C2)
When talking about the imbalance between themselves and
donors in terms of capacity to analyse data and formulate policies,
some interviewees, particularly in Pakistan, questioned donors’
motives around truly wanting to build local capacity (P3, P5), while
the manager of a disease control program in Cambodia (C5) pro-
vided examples of donors that had demonstrated higher and lower
levels of commitment. Further, one informant in Pakistan reported:
I think they (donors) also want to “burn” their money. They just
want to spend the money. Their aim is not to make Pakistan
independent. They also do not take exactly evidence based deci-
sions. (P3)
We also found that the level of coordination and collaboration
among donors was perceived by some interviewees to give them col-
lective power in forming health policies. Examples of specific donor
coordination platforms described include the Health Partners
Meeting in Cambodia and the Technical Resource Facility in
Pakistan (Mott MacDonald 2017; TRF Pakistan 2017). These plat-
forms are set up specifically with the aim of enhancing coordination
between donors and, in the opinion of interviewees that described
them (Ca8, Ca6, P12), allow donors to present a coherent and
powerful position to influence policy development. For example, a
policy advisor in Cambodia (C6) shared details about the Health
Partners Meeting, which involves the participation of bilateral and
multilateral donors, and international agencies, such as the World
Health Organization. He believed that external donor and technical
support agencies holding a closed meeting one week before the
monthly Technical Working Group for Health meeting (in which
health policies are discussed with the Cambodian government) helps
them to prepare a unified and well composed plan to present to high
level policymakers. In contrast, it appeared from account of several
interviewees (P9, P12, C5, C6, C8) that domestic policy actors had
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no similar mechanisms to organize themselves in the same way to be
able to effectively influence policy design.
Policy implementation
The main mechanism identified through which donors could influ-
ence policies being implemented on the ground was by using finan-
cial resources to shape the areas of work of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in the country. An advisor to policymakers in
Cambodia (C2) explained that he had seen sudden growths in
NGOs focusing on specific topics, often unlinked to national prior-
ities or even the NGOs own mandate, as they were dependent on
winning grants to continue their operations. In Pakistan, a similar
concern over donor influence emerged from multiple interviewees
(P6, P10, P11) who noted that funding for tuberculosis control
activities is now being controlled by a single NGO, which is the pri-
mary recipient of a US$39 million grant from a multilateral donor
(Results International 2016). Since financial flows to this NGO
dwarf independent budgets of the national and provincial tuberculo-
sis control programme, a major shift in decision-making authority
of the government policy actors was felt by those interviewees
involved in tuberculosis control in Pakistan.
Interviews further revealed that there was also a strong donor
influence on the timing of implementation of various health initia-
tives. There were instances reported in which donors’ could derail
progress towards the national strategy because ongoing external
funding was often linked with the achievement of time-sensitive
goals or political commitments (P2).
Monitoring and evaluation
Finally, in the evaluation stage of the policy process, several policy
actors interviewed (P2, P3, P5, P7, P9, P10, C1, C2) felt that donors
dictated targets that needed to be achieved for certain national
health programs. Targets included numbers of patients to be diag-
nosed or started on treatment, proportions of patients receiving a
selected intervention and numbers of diagnostic devices introduced
into health facilities. Donors often exerted influence through condi-
tionality of financial resources on achieving targets, and through
intersectoral leverage; the latter was related to donor influence on
the country’s international standing and reputation when targets
they push countries to adopt are aligned with global initiatives. For
example, an interviewee in Cambodia (C1) explained that targets
based on the global 90–90–90 HIV strategy have been powerful in
influencing programme implementation in the country because of
international support for this strategy (UNAIDS 2017). Similarly, in
Pakistan an interviewee (P12) felt that the National AIDS program
mobilized quickly because HIV was high on the global agenda even
though domestic policy actors did not see it as an urgent priority in
the Pakistan context owing to very low HIV prevalence.
While a potential positive effect of donors’ power to push for
achievement of specific targets was that this could improve the speed
and efficiency of national and provincial health programs, we found
that targets linked to global health programs hold considerable
weight and there is political pressure to adopt these ‘uniform’ targets
even when domestic actors know it is not appropriate for the con-
text. For example, three public sector programme managers
involved in tuberculosis control in Pakistan (P6, P10, P11) independ-
ently explained that the global strategy calling for a rapid scale-up
multidrug resistant (MDR) tuberculosis treatment is not what they
would recommend based on their knowledge of health systems con-
straints in monitoring adherence to treatment and managing serious
side-effects. One interviewee argued that donors should evaluate
success of a policy based on strengthening of broader capabilities
rather than on narrow targets:
If you want to achieve 2000 MDR cases, then we should train
our people on them, we should have our expert machines in pla-
ces, in proper places, we should have the right linkages, right
communications, right capacity, those processes should be
strengthened instead of looking at the target –target chasing only.
It should be the process that should be strengthened all the time.
And, my discussion with the [donor name] that I keep on saying
is that the target should not be the patients, the target should be
systems instead. (P10)
Just as donors were found to have influence in putting certain
disease specific, vertical programs high on the national health
agenda by making resources available for them, we also found that
they were able to influence the strength of monitoring and evalua-
tion of selected health areas in both countries. We identified two
main mechanisms by which this occurred. Firstly, donors influenced
which health areas information systems were enhanced for by chan-
nelling financial resources towards infrastructure development. This
included investments in standardized record keeping, moving from
paper-based to electronic information storage and capacity building
of healthcare providers to use the information systems effectively.
Secondly, donors could be instrumental in ensuring the targets for
monitoring were clearly defined, and made resources available for
regular monitoring by independent organizations.
Finally, this study indicated that the perceived lack of influence
of policy actors when negotiating health targets may have been exa-
cerbated by limitations in their power to decide which health areas
are covered by strong health monitoring and information systems.
For example, one Cambodian policy adviser explained that without
credible independent data, national policy actors were unable to
resist unrealistic targets set forth by donors or advocate for alterna-
tive health priorities, even if they disagreed with the evidence pre-
sented (C2).
Discussion
Donors are known to exert influence over policy and practice in low
resource settings, but to date only limited work has explored the
implications of power imbalances at different stages of the policy
process in aid-recipient nations. We recognize that the four stages
we analyse separately—priority setting, policy formulation, policy
implementation and monitoring and evaluation—do in fact overlap
in reality and are not discrete or linear (Walt et al. 2008).
Nonetheless, by considering them one-by-one we were able to draw
useful insights and organize the research material in a logical man-
ner. Another key contribution of this study is its direct focus on per-
ceptions and experiences of domestic health policy actors, many of
whom appeared to be struggling to gain or maintain power in one
way or another, and the variety of mechanisms through which
donors may shape policy making and interventions. Given the quali-
tative nature of the study, and the focus on two particular countries,
our findings may not be generalizable or relevant beyond them.
With this limitation in mind, however, we must note that a strik-
ing point emerging from the comparative analysis of the interviews
is the essential agreement of participants in Cambodia and Pakistan
on fundamental issues concerning their relations with international
donors. Despite significant differences in health systems, history and
engagement with the international community, policy actors in both
countries raised similar concerns over the ways that donors may
influence the policy process, leading to policies which they felt were
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often misaligned with local needs and capacities. In both countries,
we found that control of financial resources was the most commonly
identified lever by which donors influenced policy, particularly at
the priority setting and implementation stages. Many policy actors
in Cambodia and Pakistan revealed a mismatch between what
health activities they believe are important for their countries and
what happens in practice. While others have documented that con-
trol of financial resources directly influences health policy (Buse
et al. 2012), in this study settings we additionally found that control
of technical expertise through the management and strategic presen-
tation of knowledge can play an important role, with those laying
claim to expertise exercising influence and gaining authority based
on a privileged relationship to knowledge and stronger capacities to
use evidence for policy and planning.
This study also found that the influence conferred by greater
technical capacity was not only related to skills and expertise of
donors, but also to better organizational mechanisms for coordina-
tion and collaboration among donors and international technical
agencies and platforms they have set up to maximize interaction
with policy elites. In contrast, policy actors in Cambodia and
Pakistan acknowledged that domestic structures to support priority-
setting were weak and collaboration with local research bodies and
institutions was lacking. Donors’ control of financial resources can
also allow them to indirectly influence health policy agendas by
making research funding available to generate evidence in donor pri-
ority areas and not in others. In these ways, the creation of evidence
could be seen as part of a political process, reflecting what has been
described an ‘issue bias’ (Parkhurst 2017). The indirect influence of
power can also be seen to reflect broader Foucaludian ideas of a
‘power-knowledge nexus’ existing in society—by which power
works to construct knowledge and knowledge constructions further
work to establish power relations (Nola and Irzik 2005). In such
conceptualizations, power is not just identified at discrete decision
points, but rather seen to also be more diffuse: built into systems of
interactions (and discourses), which end up shaping what is consid-
ered relevant knowledge in the first place (often to the advancement
of particular interests). For instance, the discourses and long-term
interactions which work to establish particular ideas of ‘technical
expertise’ as a legitimizing source of authority can thus be privileg-
ing donor positions. Although it is worth noting that in a pure
Foucaldian sense, power is often seen as ‘subject-less,’ rather than
wielded by any particular actor, as well as being a constructive force
in society through its production of relationships and ideas (cf
Gaventa 2003). In this study, when it came to the setting of policy
goals and targets for monitoring and evaluation, donors’ influence
was strengthened by linking goals they are pushing for to global ini-
tiatives and norms, as well as providing financial resources to sup-
port selected assessment and reporting systems.
Our findings also illustrate that power relationships between
donors and aid recipients are more complex and multifaceted than
simply donors having direct influence over decisions by controlling
resource allocation. Indeed, all three of Lukes (2005) ‘dimensions’
of power are in operation within aid relationships for health policy-
making. Donor influence over the agenda, for instance, reflect long-
standing concerns over donor influence which reflect Luke’s first
face of power—power as ‘decision making’. In addition, we found
many instances of how power was exercised outside discrete
decision-making points. Political influence exercised through con-
cerns about impacts outside the health sector impacts (such as on
international reputation), for instance, illustrates how power of
donors can be structurally established in ways that end up influenc-
ing which issues get on decision agendas in the first place—thus
reflecting the second ‘dimension’ of power, at times called ‘non-deci-
sion making’—or what Lukes explains as the power ‘to decide what
is decided’ (Lukes 2005, p. 111). Lukes’ third dimension of power,
however, refers to the construction of ideas itself—and of dominant
hegemonies or ideologies (which are said to potentially shape the
‘very wants’ of a particular group) (Lukes 2005, p. 27). In our case,
this is captured in the definition and creation of policy relevant
pieces of information by those controlling research and evaluation
processes, or by establishing international ‘consensus’ about prior-
ities and needs as explained by Shiffman (2014).
In addition, our findings about specific mechanisms that can
result in donors having greater power—beyond direct control of
financial resources for health—may have implications for addressing
the power imbalance. Although increased funding for health from
national and provincial governments in lower-income countries
would be one way to alter power dynamics, this is not straightfor-
ward to achieve; the competing demands for budget allocation and
development assistance for health from donors has been shown to
reduce government spending on health in LMICs (Lu et al. 2010).
However, policy actors in lower income countries could address the
perceived power imbalance in technical expertise even with limited
resources, for example, through better coordination of domestic
stakeholders and organization of platforms for agenda setting and
policy formulation.
Concerns about power imbalances must also be kept in mind
considering the global health and development community’s contin-
ued use of language of ‘evidence based policymaking’ to justify par-
ticular decision-making strategies, systems and norms in the health
sector. Appeals to technical evidence—typically of intervention
effect or cost effectiveness measured over a small set of outcomes—
is common; yet our findings illustrate just how many other concerns
may be at stake in health decision making, and further point to
important governance concerns around the process by which evi-
dence is brought to bear and used to prioritize, legitimize, or justify
particular policy actions. Concerns over national autonomy, local
accountability, local capacity building, and competing social values
rarely are directly addressed in health policy development processes,
yet all were touched on as important in these settings. We further
saw some examples of activities by international actors to not only
use evidence to inform specific decisions, but to build structures and
institutions within countries as well that may shape how evidence is
created and utilized to inform decision making. It may be that ‘new
aid approaches’ (or ‘post-conditionality’ approaches)—involving
supporting national data systems, establishment of technical expert
bodies or funding of research agendas—can have important gover-
nance implications (Harrison 2001).
Our findings on existing power imbalances must also be consid-
ered in light of the countries’ historical background and ongoing
changes in decision-making dynamics. Though Cambodia and
Pakistan faced many challenges in the past four decades, which have
slowed development and weakened state and health system infra-
structure and institutions, recent institutional reform and economic
growth in both countries have bolstered local capacities for
decision-making and programme implementation. Therefore, a
shift in power balance may occur going forward. In 2007, the
Cambodian government introduced a Midwifery Incentive Scheme,
which aimed to reduce maternal mortality rates by paying midwives
with cash incentives based on the number of public health facility-
based deliveries they attended. This policy, which is entirely imple-
mented and financed by the national government has been successful
(Ir et al. 2015) and illustrates a shift to local leadership in policy for-
mulation and management. The Cambodian government has also
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taken greater financial responsibility for health policies which were
originally introduced and supported only by international actors—
such as the Health Equity Funds (Annear et al. 2015)— another key
development which is likely to improve sustainability of interven-
tions and their alignment with local structures and capacities.
Although domestic policy actors’ role in funding, designing and
implementing of health policies in Cambodia has increased, capacity
for monitoring and evaluation of health programmes is still develop-
ing (University Health Sciences of Cambodia 2015).
As with Cambodia, in Pakistan there are indications of an
increasing role of domestic policy actors in agenda setting, policy
formulation and policy implementation. For example, Pakistan has
recently been recognized internationally for developing locally
appropriate public health innovations—such as the community-
based Lady Health Worker programme—and policymakers from
Pakistan have impacted on health policy on a national and global
arena (Horton 2013). Unlike Cambodia, increased government
spending on health is a critical area which has not yet seen substan-
tial improvements (Khan and Van den Heuvel 2007; Nishtar et al.
2013), although hospital budgets for medicines and renovations
have increased following devolution (Zaidi et al. 2017). The volatil-
ity of international aid commitments has also been a challenge for
Pakistan; for some policy actors in Pakistan this appears to have
resulted in a mistrust of donors and NGOs supported by interna-
tional donors (Bano 2012).
Lastly, a number of limitations in our study must be noted. First,
as acknowledged by others, the perspectives of policy actors can
often be difficult to investigate, particularly when researchers
require insider access to domestic policy elites, and skills in building
rapport with interviewees to discuss potentially sensitive topics
(Walt et al. 2008). Second, we recognize that—despite identifying a
number of recurring themes—we may not have achieved saturation.
Since this study focused on two countries and did not capture donor
perspectives, further research should be conducted to refine our con-
clusions and enhance their theoretical value. Third, we found that
our analysis touched upon deeper and broader structural elements
than initially expected, but we could not explore these issues in-
depth. Indeed, the ways that donors exert power by shaping policy-
relevant evidence, ideas, and discourse, or the structural changes
donors may be making in the name of informing policymaking,
could each be subjects of their own further investigations. For exam-
ple, we are unaware of substantial research in lower-income settings
exploring in depth the effects of donor efforts to shape structures
and mechanisms for the use of evidence in the policy process. As
such, this may serve as a useful area for future work to understand
the exercise of power by donors within health policymaking in aid-
recipient nations, not just over individual decisions or programmes,
but at a systemic level as well.
Conclusion
National structures for decision-making have improved in
Cambodia and Pakistan. Nonetheless, many participants in this
study expressed some frustration with international donors, and
their ability to influence the policy process through financial means,
unequal distribution of expertise and imbalances in technical and
organizational resources for strategic planning. There was a recogni-
tion among domestic policy actors that low investment in health by
their own governments was partly responsible for the power imbal-
ance. Awareness of these perceptions is important in the current
debate on international development. Despite changes in the aid
architecture, grievances about donor approaches remain deep seated
in some LMICs, reflecting wider imbalances in the context of global
political economy and international relations.
As we have seen and other studies documented, unequal power
relations may still be perpetuated in subtle ways, including exclu-
sionary practices in knowledge production, dissemination, and uti-
lization for policy and planning. Thus, a truly ‘new aid approach’
should reconsider not only macroeconomic aspects, such as financ-
ing and lending modalities, but also important issues in the daily
practice of donor–recipient relations, including the extent to which
local expertise is supported, valued and involved at all stages in the
policy process.
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